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Understanding the targeting decisions of terrorist organizations is a key concept that 
has been largely overlooked in counter-terrorism research. The success of terrorist 
organizations in Lebanon motivates the current study to assess how their operational 
decisions changed as Lebanon transitioned from civil war to state instability. Guided 
by rational choice theory, I explore the idea that terrorist organizations target entities 
that are most threatening to their chances of survival using data from the Global 
Terrorism Database. Specifically, the study uses multinomial logistic regression 
models to understand terrorist targeting choices in Lebanon from 1975 to 2018. While 
Lebanon is only a case study, I anticipate that the conclusions drawn here can help us 
understand similar dynamics in other parts of the world. The primary analysis finds a 
lack of support in predicted patterns of  terrorist targeting. This study also includes a 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
When engaging in a terrorist attack, terrorist organizations must decide 
whether to attack civilians or a harder to reach target. A harder to reach target is a 
target that is not easily accessible or is heavily defended, resulting in the target being 
less vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Polo, 2019). Organizations may attack civilians 
one day and then attack harder to reach targets such a country’s military base, 
seemingly without a reason or pattern. Within the field of terrorism research, there is 
a large debate on the rationality of target selection. Some researchers argue that 
terrorism is ineffective in achieving its goals, thus resulting in the selection process of 
choosing a specific target to attack being irrational (Abrahms, 2004, 2006, 2008; 
Calhoun, 2002; Gupta, 2008; Jenkins, 2006).  
However, ideas posited by the rational choice theory may indicate that a 
terrorist organization’s decision to attack a specific group of individuals is carefully 
planned and completely logical. Researchers argue that target selection is a rational 
process, in which terrorist organizations make a calculated decision to target the 
group of individuals that will best help achieve a specific goal or objective (Anderton 
& Carter, 2006; Caplan, 2006; Crenshaw, 1987, 1990; Drake, 1998; Pape, 2005; Perry 
& Hasisi, 2015; Shughart, 2011). The changes in target selection could be due to the 
hardening of certain targets or limited by the available resources as suggested by 
Drake (1998). In this proposed thesis, I argue that terrorist organizations change their 
targeting strategies based on which targeting group appears to be the most 





specifically, I will examine the nature of terrorist attacks during and after the 
Lebanese civil war in order to determine if target selection changes according to who 
poses the greater threat to terrorist organizations. I draw upon Becker’s (1968) 
perspective on the rational choice theory to craft my argument. 
A terrorist organization’s choice to target a specific group of individuals helps 
demonstrate the organization’s goals and intentions to civilians, government officials, 
terrorist constituencies, and leaders of the world (Hoffman, 2006). Polo (2019) 
suggests that the choice for terrorist organizations to attack undefended civilians and 
official government targets reflects an intricate balance between harming opponents 
and gaining support for the terrorist organizations’ cause. The benefits of attacking 
civilians include that it requires fewer resources, the attacks are highly newsworthy, 
and it undermines government control (Polo, 2019). However, these benefits often 
come at a cost, as civilians may be repulsed by the organization after witnessing the 
senseless loss of life, undermining any legitimacy that the organization is trying to 
gain.  
Alternatively, attacking the government directly could preserve the group’s 
legitimacy, especially if the government is seen as problematic. Attacks against the 
government disrupts and discredits the government by weakening it administratively, 
impairing normal operations, and demoralizing government officials (Crenshaw, 
1981). By delegitimizing the government and boosting its own legitimacy, the group 
is better able to recruit civilians as fighters and auxiliary supporters. However, it takes 
greater resources and requires greater planning to attack the government, as officials 





more vulnerable to intervention, which could make the terrorist organization appear 
weak if the attack is thwarted. Thus, the decision of who to attack is strategic and 
requires the organization to optimize the best outcome given its current set of 
circumstances. Lebanon’s history provides a rich array of changing circumstances 
that, I argue, shifts the targeting strategy for its terrorist organizations. As described 
below, at different periods in Lebanon’s history, terrorists might be more drawn to 
targeting other terrorist organizations, foreign governments, or the Lebanese 
government depending on who poses the greater threat to its survival, and which 
targeting strategy will help the organization thrive. 
Across Lebanon’s history, terrorism has been allowed to flourish due to 
tension and conflict between major Lebanese organizations. Major shifts in tension 
occurred during impactful Lebanese events, including the Lebanese civil war and 
after Lebanon became a failed state. Contributing to the start of Lebanon’s civil war 
in 1975 was the conflict generated by power imbalances between Maronite 
Christians, Sunnis, and Shias religious groups (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). After the civil war 
ended, theory would suggest that the primary tension shifted to between foreign 
governments and Lebanese terrorist organizations, due to the control of Lebanese 
territory by Syria and Israel. After state failure in 2005, theory would suggest that the 
primary tension once again shifted to focus on fighting between terrorist 
organizations and the Lebanese government due to unassigned positions of power 
generated from Syria and Israel ending their occupation of Lebanon. Overall, the 
continued conflict throughout Lebanon’s history helped strengthen terrorist 





Lebanese civilians and destroying the legitimacy of the Lebanese government (Galey, 
2012).  
The success of terrorist organizations in Lebanon motivates the proposed 
thesis to assess how their operational decisions changed as Lebanon transitioned from 
the civil war to complete state failure. Guided by rational choice theory, I produce a 
set of hypotheses that are guided by the principle that terrorist organizations target 
entities that are most threatening to their acquisition of power. Ideally, I would like to 
study this problem based on specific terrorist organizations’ targeting decisions. 
However, due to the large number of cases unattributed to any terrorist organization, I 
will be using the terrorist attack as the unit of analysis. I am interested in testing if 
terrorist organizations overall change their targeting strategies based on threats to the 
organizations’ survival, as suggested by Crenshaw (1987). These hypotheses are 
tested using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), as provided by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START). The GTD is an open-source database that includes information on domestic 
and international terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2018.  
Lebanon is an ideal candidate for the current case study because of the 
constant conflict and power struggles between non-state actors (including terrorist 
organizations) and the Lebanese government. This struggle, I argue, resulted in 
changes to targeting strategies to obtain the greatest benefit for the terrorist 
organizations. Lebanon also provides a unique opportunity to test the idea that 
terrorist organizations target individuals who pose the greatest threat to their survival. 





Lebanon’s civil war. After struggling for 30 years, prominent terrorist organizations 
were able to gain power and thrive after the state failure of Lebanon, which had left 
the government weak. These historical events create an avenue to test Crenshaw’s 
claims on terrorist targeting strategies. While Lebanon is only a case study, I 
anticipate that lessons learned here can help us understand similar dynamics in other 
parts of the world. For example, Syria’s civil war in 2011 also began as a conflict 
between non-state actors (terrorist organizations such as the Free Syrian Army) and 
the Syrian government (Al Jazeera, 2018). By understanding how terrorist targeting 
strategies changed in Lebanon during the civil war, we gain insight into how terrorist 
targeting strategies in Syria may be influenced by their own civil war. 
In the proposed thesis, I begin by discussing the events that led to Lebanon’s 
civil war and the major historical events occurring during my study period. Conflict 
between different non-state actors resulted in the civil war and, I argue, directly 
impacted the target selection of terrorist organizations from 1975 to 2018. In chapter 
2, I discuss the rational choice theory and apply it to target selection of terrorist 
attacks in Lebanon. The third chapter outlines the data sources and methods including 
my analytic plan, independent and dependent variables, and hypotheses. The fourth 
chapter reviews the results and its application to the hypotheses. The thesis ends with 








Chapter 2: Background 
 
Before analyzing the targeting decisions of terrorist organizations in Lebanon, I 
provide an overview of the major events that helped contribute to the power 
imbalances that later led Lebanon to become the failed state it is today. According to 
Rotberg (2003), a failed state is unable to control its own borders or display the 
necessary power over its own territory and faces constant threats of secession, civil 
war, and large-scale violent internal struggles for control between the government and 
one or more non-state actors. This description applies to Lebanon in two major ways 
and shows why Lebanon is considered a failed state. First, the Lebanese government 
continues to face power struggles from non-state actors. Examples of non-state actors 
that fight for power include many different terrorist organizations (such as Hezbollah) 
and powerful ruling clans (such as the Meqdad clan) (Harris, 2012). Second, Lebanon 
continues to face violent terrorist attacks, which are aimed at gaining power, territory, 
or acknowledgement by terrorist organizations. For example, in May 2018, Hezbollah 
won 70 seats in Lebanon’s parliament, which was the first time in nine years an 
election was held to determine the leadership of parliament (“Lebanon profile – 
Timeline”, 2018). However, Hezbollah then delayed the formation of the new 
government for eight months, in order to gain more power and control in Lebanon’s 
government.  
Other key characteristics of state failure are lack of control by the government 
over the country and its citizens, lack of faith in the government’s ability to protect its 
own citizens, a lack of a stable political system, and an inability to provide a 





Lebanon, a power struggle began between terrorist organizations and the Lebanese 
government for the unoccupied positions of power. Due to the lack of control by the 
government, many Lebanese citizens lost faith in Lebanon’s social institutions, 
including Lebanon’s police force, army, judiciary system, and government (Barma, 
2016). The Lebanese government was unable to provide protection to its citizens and 
this role was outsourced to other non-state actors (Galey, 2012).  Based on perceived 
powerlessness of the Lebanese government by its civilians after Syria withdrew, 
Lebanon became a failed state. I use a dichotomous measure of state failure to define 
the cases classified under time period 3 (after state failure) because terrorist attacks 
and historical events that occurred during this period were related to the conflict 
between terrorist organizations and the Lebanese government. The terrorist attacks 
and historical events that occurred before Syria ended its occupation in 2005 were 
related to the conflict between Syria and Israel’s continued occupation of Lebanon 
and the Lebanese citizens, which are the characteristics that define time period 2 
(after civil war).  
I will also discuss significant events occurring during my study period from 
1975 to 2018 to provide the context needed to understanding the expected utility 
functions of terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon at that time. Expected utility 
functions are when an individual will choose a behavior which will maximize the 
potential benefits and minimize the potential costs (Becker, 1968). Potential offenders 
are constantly making a choice, to either engage in criminal behavior or engage in 
law abiding behavior, depending on which action will benefit the individual the most 





face the same decision processes, in which the organizations choose to engage in a 
terrorist attack or target a specific group of individuals based on which behavior will 
provide the greatest benefit to the organization and will limit the potential costs. 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the rational choice theory and its application 
to the study.  
Historical Context 
Lebanon has been ruled by many different groups, including foreign 
governments. Initially, Lebanon was ruled by the Turkish until 1918, due to the defeat 
and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Harris, 2012). The French then took control 
of Lebanon based on the French Mandate for Syria and Lebanon in 1920 (Harris, 
2012). The French created the state of Greater Lebanon as a safe haven for Maronite 
Christians but neglected the large Muslim population within its borders (Harris, 
2012). This neglect led to power imbalances between the Maronite Christians, Sunnis, 
and Shias, building resentment, bitterness, and hostility in the Muslim communities 
toward the French and Maronite Christians. 
After France relinquished their power and control over Lebanon, Lebanon 
gained independence from foreign rule in 1943 (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). The Maronites 
primarily assumed power over the country and economy. The rising tension between 
the Sunnis, Shias, and Maronites led to the signing of the national pact. In an attempt 
to balance power between the Christians, Sunnis, and Shia’s, each group was assigned 
to fulfill a parliament position. The president was required to be Maronite, the prime 





As attempts were made to stem the rising hostility between the three major 
religious groups, further conflict continued to escalate the situation. The 1948 Arab-
Israeli War led to an influx of Palestinian refugees, making the Lebanese weary of 
foreign civilians (Harris, 2012). In 1958, Lebanese President Camille Chamoun asked 
the U.S. to intervene, as a civil war between Maronite Christians and Lebanese 
Muslims seemed imminent (see Appendix A for further details) (Harris, 2012). This 
invitation resulted in exacerbating the mounting tension and sowed the seeds of 
mistrust between Lebanese civilians and the government.  
Conflict in other countries of the Middle East also contributed to Lebanon’s 
rising tension. During the Israeli Six Day War in 1967, Palestinians used Lebanese 
territory as a base for attacks on Israel, straining Lebanese/Israeli relations (Ṭarābulsī, 
2012). In 1968, there were two major attacks against Israel, further weakening 
relationships between Israel and Lebanon (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000) 
(see Appendix A for further detail). Within Lebanon, political tensions also intensified 
between Christian and Muslim groups after these attacks. 
The next major clash between Christian and Muslim groups was the 1969 
Cairo Agreement (Ṭarābulsī, 2012), which granted the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) autonomy over Palestinian refugee camps operating in Lebanon 
and access routes to northern Israel in return for PLO recognition of Lebanese 
sovereignty (see Appendix A for further detail). The agreement heightened hostility 
between PLO and Maronite Christian groups, ultimately leading to the event known 
as the Bus Massacre on April 13, 1975. The Bus Massacre, also known as the "Ain el-





Phalangist (a Lebanese Christian militia) and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) (Harris, 2012). The tension that had existed between religious groups for years 
had finally erupted into full scale violent conflicts, marking the official beginning of 
Lebanon’s civil war.  
Armed clashes between PLO guerrilla factions and other Christian militias 
heightened the tension between Maronite Christian and Lebanese Muslim groups. 
Finally, on December 6, 1975 the event known as Black Saturday occurred 
(Ṭarābulsī, 2012). Four members of the Phalangist group were killed, resulting in the 
Phalange setting up roadblocks throughout Beirut to inspect identification cards for 
religious affiliation. Many Palestinian or Lebanese Muslims who passed through 
these roadblocks were killed immediately. After this incident, all militias from each of 
the religious groups (Christian Maronite, Sunnis, and Shias) joined the fighting 
(Harris, 2012). 
In October 1976, Syria was granted access to Lebanon. Syria was mandated 
by the Arab League to restore peace and the Arab Deterrent Force was created to aid 
in Syria’s mission (Maksoud, Bugh, Barnett, Khalaf, Kingston, & Ochsenwald, 
2020). Maronite Christian militias were against the power granted to Syria, which led 
to the Hundred Days War between Maronite Christian militias and the Syrian troops 
of the Arab Deterrent Force from February 7, 1978 to April 1978 (Harris, 2012). This 
conflict resulted in Syria’s expulsion from East Beirut and the end of Arab Deterrent 
Force’s peace-keeping mission in Lebanon.   
Tension between the PLO and Israel continued to escalate. The PLO faction, 





attempt to ruin Israeli-Egyptian peace talks and to damage tourism in Israel (Maksoud 
et al, 2020). In response, on March 14, 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani. Israeli 
forces, aided by Phalangist militants, pushed PLO forces out of southern Lebanon 
(Ṭarābulsī, 2012). The resulting conflicts led to the establishment of the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was charged with establishing peace in Lebanon 
and to oversee the withdraw of Israel from Lebanese territory. At the same time, 
Israel provided financial resources and weaponry to the newly created South 
Lebanese Army, who fought against PLO and Shiite militants to re-capture territory 
in southern Lebanon (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). Conflict between PLO and Israel continued to 
grow, leading to Israel invading Lebanon again on June 6, 1982 in response to 
Palestinian guerilla attacks and the attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador to 
the United Kingdom (Harris, 2012). By June 15, 1982, Israeli units were entrenched 
outside Beirut and the U.S. began calling for the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon 
(Ṭarābulsī, 2012). The first troops of a multinational force landed in Beirut on August 
21, 1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon. An agreement was also 
reached to maintain a multinational force of U.S. Marines, French, Italian, and British 
soldiers in Lebanon (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). 
The U.S. continued to advocate for peace in Lebanon, resulting in the creation 
of a peace agreement on May 17, 1983, stating that Israel would withdraw its troops 
conditional on the departure of Syrian troops (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). Many Lebanese 
Muslims viewed the peace agreement as a way for Israel to gain permanent power 
over southern Lebanon and vehemently opposed the agreement (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). 





thus halting any further discussions of peace. Resentment against foreign government 
interference increased, until Hezbollah carried out a suicide bombing on French and 
American military barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983 (Maksoud et al., 2020). 
This resulted in the Lebanese government cancelling the May 17 agreement on March 
5, 1984 and President Reagan withdrawing all U.S. Marines from Lebanon (Harris, 
2012). 
Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at 
national reconciliation failed (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). Finally, in September 1989, the Taif 
Agreement was created to end the civil war and to balance power between the 
Maronite Christians, Sunnis, and Shias. The agreement reorganized the government 
by reducing the power of the traditionally Maronite president and re-distributing the 
number of parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, and senior administrative positions to 
achieve equal power and representation of Christian and Muslim officials (Ṭarābulsī, 
2012) . The agreement also called for the disarmament of all militias, the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces, and for Syrian forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of up to two 
years to help assist the new government (Maksoud et al, 2020).  
Even though the civil war was technically over, fighting and conflict 
continued until the October 13, 1990 Massacre in Beirut. Conflict occurred between 
the Syrian Army and Lebanese militias due to Prime Minister Michel Aoun 
declaration of the War of Liberation against Syrian occupation of Lebanon (Ṭarābulsī, 
2012) . An estimated 700 Lebanese civilians were killed, 2000 Lebanese civilians 
injured, and at least 400 Lebanese Army soldiers executed (Maksoud et al., 2020). 





the 1990 Massacre is known as the official end to Lebanon’s civil war (Harris, 2012; 
Maksoud et al., 2020; “Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018; Ṭarābulsī, 2012).   
Before the two-year deadline established in the Taif Agreement ended, a 
treaty of “fraternity, coordination, and cooperation” was signed on May 22, 1991 
between Lebanon and Syria to legitimize Syria’s continued presence in Lebanon 
(Maksoud et al., 2020). In the same month, the National Assembly ordered the 
dissolution of all militias, except for Hezbollah (“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018). 
In 1992, Lebanon held its first free election since before the start of the war in 1972 
(“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018). Even though the Lebanese government made 
attempts to re-establish the political power of the government, the continued 
occupation by Israel and Syria prevented the country from gaining total 
independence. 
In response to Israel’s continued occupation in Lebanon, tension and fighting 
between Lebanese militias and Israel intensified (Maksoud et al, 2020). Israel then 
launched Operation Grapes of Wrath on April 1996, in which Israel bombed 
Hezbollah bases in southern Lebanon, southern Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley 
(“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018). The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group with 
members from U.S., France, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria was then established to 
monitor a truce between Israel and Lebanon and eventually led to Israel beginning to 
withdraw from Lebanon. On May 23, 2000, Israel officially ended its occupation of 
Lebanon (“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018). Syria refused to exit Lebanon and 
calls for Syrian disengagement by Maronite Christians and Sunnis rapidly increased. 





internal Lebanese matters (Maksoud et al, 2020). In response to Syria refusing to end 
its occupation, the UN Security Council adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 
1559 on September 2, 2004 (Maksoud et al., 2020). The resolution called for all 
foreign forces to cease occupying Lebanon and for the disbanding and disarmament 
of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Starting February 21, 2005, daily protests 
of Syria’s continued occupation of Lebanon began by Lebanese Christians, Sunnis, 
and Shias (Maksoud et al., 2020). On April 26, 2005, Syria officially ended its 
occupation of Lebanon (“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018).  
After all foreign governments had withdrawn from Lebanon, issues related to 
political power and representation in the Lebanese government arose. As the end of 
President Lahoud’s nine-year period in office approached in late 2007, attempts to 
select a new president were delayed, due to March 9 bloc group refusing to accept 
any successor until they received a greater share of political power (Maksoud et al., 
2020).  This resulted in Lahoud’s term ending in November 2007 and opposing 
political parties continued to fight over the position. The position remained unfilled 
until May 21, 2008, when the Doha Agreement was signed to end Hezbollah’s 2008 
Coup Attempt (“Lebanon profile – Timeline”, 2018). In this agreement, Hezbollah 
gained veto power in government and required that Michel Suleiman would be 
elected president. At that time, Michel Suleiman was the commander of the Lebanese 
Armed Forces and had recently helped navigate a peace agreement between the 
Lebanese government and Hezbollah (Maksoud et al., 2020). He was the only 





an independent and the respect he had gained throughout his extensive military career 
(Maksoud et al., 2020).  
Over the next 10 years, Hezbollah continued to undermine the government 
and advocated for more political power. In January 2011, a group of 11 minsters from 
Hezbollah and allied parties resigned from the government due to disagreements 
between Hezbollah and other political parties, causing the government to collapse 
(Maksoud et al., 2020). After five months of deliberation, the new prime minister 
granted eight additional parliament seats to Hezbollah and its allies in order to 
reconvene the government. Next, Lebanon’s political system came to a halt in 2014 
for two years when President Suleiman resigned from office. Hezbollah delayed 
electing a new president until Lebanon’s other political parties finally acceded to their 
demands of electing Michel Aoun as the new president in October 2016 (Maksoud et 
al., 2020). Michel Aoun had formed an alliance between the political party he led 
(Free Patriotic Movement) and Hezbollah in 2006 (Maksoud et al., 2020). Michel 
Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement supported Hezbollah throughout the years in a 
variety of situations, such as helping Hezbollah in their war against Israel. In return, 
Hezbollah secured Michel Aoun’s election as Lebanon’s next president (Maksoud et 
al., 2020).   
On November 3, 2017, Prime Minister Saad Hariri visited Saudi Arabia, 
announced his resignation, and accused Hezbollah and Iran of destabilizing Lebanon. 
Hezbollah rejected the claims and accused Saudi Arabia of directing Hariri to resign 
in order to weaken Hezbollah. Hariri then returned to Lebanon on November 22 and 





held its first legislative election since 2009 on May 6, 2018. Hezbollah and its allies 
won the majority of seats in Lebanon’s parliament, thus resulting in Hezbollah being 
the dominant political party for the first time in Lebanon’s history. The formation of 
the new government was delayed until January 31, 2019 due to continued 
disagreements between political parties and Hezbollah’s demands for one of the 
Sunni representative’s cabinet seats. In the next section, I discuss how the shifting 
tensions and conflicts throughout Lebanese’ history influenced terrorist 
organizations’ utility functions and targeting decisions.  
 
Target Selection and Rational Choice Theory 
Researchers have tested to see if target selection is a rational process, in which 
terrorist organizations make the decision to target a specific group of individuals 
(Anderton & Carter, 2006; Caplan, 2006; Crenshaw, 1990; Drake, 1998; Pape, 2005; 
Perry & Hasisi, 2015). Target selection is based on calculating which targets will 
yield the greatest benefit to the organization and will limit the potential costs from 
attacking the specific target (Shughart, 2011). For the proposed thesis, I will use ideas 
from Becker’s (1968) framing of the rational choice model of crime to help elucidate 
the targeting choices of Lebanese terrorist organizations based on which targets might 
optimize their utility during different periods in Lebanon’s history. I will be focusing 
on the general targeting strategies of Lebanese terrorist organizations, instead of 






The rational choice model of crime suggests that individuals will take into 
consideration both the costs and benefits of committing a specific action, may it be a 
law-abiding behavior or engaging in a crime (Becker, 1968). Becker frames the 
rational choice decision by using the expected utility function to account for the 
components of risk and reward, as demonstrated in equation 1.   
𝐸𝑈 =  𝑝𝑈(𝑌 − 𝑎) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑌)   (1) 
According to equation 1, 𝑌 represents the gains achieved after committing the 
crime and not being apprehended; a is the severity of punishment if apprehended; p 
represents the potential offender’s likelihood of getting caught and convicted of the 
crime. Individuals may choose to not commit a crime if the potential benefits (𝑌) are 
too low and the chances of being caught (p) and given a severe punishment (a) are 
too high. Thus, the decision to engage in criminal behavior for person i depends on 
whether E(𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑖> E(𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑖, in which the 𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 is simply the status quo.  
Becker’s utility function has been applied in a variety of different crimes such 
as drunk driving, sexual assault, burglary, and terrorism. Nagin and Paternoster 
(1993) conducted a study with undergraduate college students to assess potential 
engagement in drunk driving, sexual assault, and theft based on varying costs and 
benefits. They found that attractiveness of the crime target, the ease of committing the 
crime with minimum risk, and perceptions of the costs and benefits of committing the 
crime were all significantly related to all offending decisions. An individual would 
engage in any of the three offenses if they believed that the chances of being caught 






Hakim, Rengert, and Shachmurove (2005) conducted a study to investigate if 
differences in expected utility functions based on home characteristics lead to the 
decision to burglarize or not burglarize a home. The study found that if there are no 
security precautions and the house is more isolated from potential guardians, the 
lower the costs to the offender and the greater chance the offender will choose to 
commit the burglary. Also, targeting expensive homes will provide the greatest 
benefits to the burglar, thus leading to a greater chance of burglary. 
Finally, Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) created a second utility function to 
measure the utility of refraining from perpetrating a terrorist attack in Israel. By 
increasing the benefits gained for terrorists not engaging in attacks, terrorists would 
choose to engage in the non-terrorist behavior, leading to a reduction in terrorist 
attacks overall. The study found that increasing the number of conciliatory actions by 
the government on non-terrorist behavior was related to decreases in terrorist attacks 
in Israel. In contrast, increasing the repressive actions by the government on terrorist 
behavior was either unrelated to terrorist attacks or led to increases in terrorist 
attacks.  
Utility functions are a helpful concept in understanding why some individuals 
engage in criminal or terrorist behaviors. Every individual’s or organization’s utility 
function varies, depending on what the individual or organization values most. While 
terrorist organizations have different motives and stated goals, Crenshaw (1987) 
argues that they also all share one common goal, to survive and eventually thrive. In 
order to optimize their utility function, the terrorist organizations would make 





survival. Therefore, I argue in this thesis that terrorist organizations carefully select 
their targets to maximize their own utility function while satisfying their main 
objective (survival). One strategy is to attack any entity or group that poses a threat to 
that survival. Attacking the group that poses the greatest threat potentially increases 
the chances of the organization’s survival, thus helping to optimize the organization’s 
utility function1. As represented in equation 2, the utility function measures the power 
and perseverance of the organization to survive.  
𝐸(𝑈𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖𝑈(𝑌𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑈(𝑌𝑖)  (2) 
According to equation 2, 𝑌𝑖 represents the gains achieved after targeting a 
group i and not being apprehended as well as an organization’s chance of survival; 
𝑎𝑖is the severity of punishment if apprehended; 𝑝𝑖represents the terrorist 
organization’s likelihood of getting caught and punished for targeting a specific 
group. Thus, the decision to attack one target over another depends on which target 
will most likely optimize the organization’s utility function. One important 
component of targeting strategies is that they change over time due to varying levels 
of perceived threat to all terrorist organization’s survival, which is the case in 
Lebanon. Appendix B provides a summary timeline of key moments in Lebanese 
history and identifies if the event occurred during the civil war, after the civil war, or 
after state failure. Each time period had tensions and conflicts between different 
groups, resulting in predicted changes in terrorist targeting strategies.  
 
1 I use the word “group” to refer to a type of entity and not a specific organization. To keep this 





As discussed previously, before the civil war, tension primarily existed 
between religious organizations based on power imbalances between the Maronite 
Christians, Shias, and Sunnis (Harris, 2012). Eventually, this tension led to violent 
conflict and the beginning of the civil war, allowing religious organizations to fight 
for dominance over other groups (Ṭarābulsī, 2012). Based on the tension between 
religious and terrorist organizations, other terrorist organizations held the greatest 
threat due to attempts to gain power during the turmoil of the civil war. If this theory 
is correct, all terrorist organizations should have changed their primary targeting to 
other terrorist organizations during Lebanon’s civil war to maximize their own utility 
function and ensure their own survival over other terrorist organizations.  
After the civil war, tension shifted from conflict between terrorist 
organizations to conflict between terrorist organizations and the foreign governments, 
especially the governments of Israel and Syria. Even though individual terrorist 
organizations operating in Lebanon have different incentives for attacking either 
Israel or Syria, I will study the overall decision for terrorist organizations to attack 
any foreign entity instead of differentiating between attacking Israeli or Syrian 
targets. I will include a supplemental analysis that studies the targeting strategies of 
specific ideology groups, such as Hezbollah, to account for these differing 
motivations.  
Due to the continued occupation by Syria and Israel after Lebanon’s civil war, 
terrorist organizations felt the most threatened by these foreign governments and 
wanted to remove them from Lebanon. Threats to the survival of terrorist 





varying targeting types amongst terrorist organizations. Attacks occurring in foreign 
controlled territory would have target types of foreign nationalities more than attacks 
occurring in only Lebanese controlled territory. The potential benefits of attacking 
foreign governments include gaining power and recognition for attacking a high-level 
target (Polo, 2019). Also, control of Lebanese territory by Israel and Syria after the 
civil war built stability, which threatened the survival of terrorist organizations. If this 
theory is correct, then all terrorist organizations should have reacted to this threat by 
changing the primary targeting type to foreign governments, in order to weaken the 
power and control foreign governments had over Lebanese territory and gain this 
power for the terrorist organization. The frequency of attacks against foreign 
governments by terrorist organizations should increase until 2005, when Syria 
officially ended its occupation of Lebanon (Addis, 2011). 
After Syria ended its occupation of Lebanon, a power struggle began between 
terrorist organizations and the Lebanese government based on power vacuums left 
after Israel and Syria ended their occupation of Lebanon. As previously discussed, 
Lebanon became a failed state due to the lack of control by the Lebanese government. 
With the Lebanese government being unable to protect citizens from foreign 
intervention and terrorist attacks, radical movements were better able to grow in 
power. Based on the inability of the Lebanese government to react against terrorist 
attacks, survival of the terrorist organizations was no longer threatened, and the 
primary objective of the terrorist organizations should have theoretically changed. If 
this theory is correct, then instead of focusing solely on survival, all terrorist 





organizations by attacking the Lebanese government to gain the power associated 
with attacking a high-level target (Crenshaw, 1981). Also, terrorist organizations 
attack governmental targets in order to gain recognition as non-state actors with 
political power that are legitimate alternatives to the Lebanese government 
(Crenshaw, 1981). For example, Hezbollah emerged as a legitimate alternative to the 
Lebanese government by offering social services to Lebanese civilians and has even 
gained political power within the Lebanese government (Maksoud et al., 2020). 
Ultimately, all terrorist organizations should have changed their targeting strategies 
after Lebanon became a failed state to gain power and prevent the Lebanese 
government from having full control over the country.  
 
Hypotheses 
Based on the rational choice theory and terrorist organizations’ focus on 
survival, the thesis poses several hypotheses for terrorist targeting strategies in 
Lebanon. Due to significant periods of conflict in Lebanon’s history (including during 
the civil war, after the civil war, and after state failure), Lebanese terrorist 
organizations will target groups that appear the most threatening to the organization’s 
primary objectives (either to survive or thrive). Figure 1 indicates the total number of 









Figure 1: Timeline of Total Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon 
 
H1: During the civil war, terrorist organizations had the highest probability of 
being targeted, net other factors. 
Based on tensions between religious groups before the civil war, conflict and 
fighting occurred due to direct competition between terrorist organizations to gain 
power needed to ensure survival. The theory would claim that other terrorist 
organizations posed the greatest threat to the terrorist organization’s survival.  
H2: After the civil war and prior to state failure, foreign governments had the 
highest probability of being targeted, net other factors.  
The theory would claim that terrorist organizations after the civil war shifted 
target types to foreign governments. Foreign governments held considerable power in 
ruling large portions of Lebanese territory and terrorist organizations’ survival was 
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H3: After state failure, the Lebanese government had the highest probability 
of being targeted, net other factors.  
After Lebanon became a failed state in 2005, the theory would claim that the 
target type shifted from foreign governments to the Lebanese government because the 
terrorist organizations and the Lebanese government were fighting to gain power. The 
Lebanese government wanted to gain the power lost to Syria and Israel during the 
civil war, but terrorist organizations wanted to gain this power for themselves. The 
theory would indicate that terrorist organizations no longer focused on survival, but 
instead focused on thriving and delegitimizing the Lebanese government to allow 
terrorism to flourish. 
 





Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
To test the above hypotheses, I use data from the Global Terrorism Database 
to assess how one of three major time periods in Lebanon’s history (during the civil 
war, after the civil war, and after state failure) influences the targeting type of terrorist 
organizations and provide controls for the relationship between these key phenomena. 
Instead of conditioning on the specific terrorist organization, the unit of analysis for 
the thesis is the specific terrorist incident. I am interested in understanding why 
terrorist organizations overall change their targeting strategies rather than focusing on 
specific perpetrators and their targeting strategies. In order to focus on the collective 
targeting strategies, I will be controlling for the types of organizations if known. I 
begin with a discussion of the Global Terrorism Database, describing the strengths 
and weaknesses of using these data for this research. I discuss the outcome of interest, 
along with the independent and control variables. Finally, I explain the methodology 
including the analytic method of choice, the multinominal logistic regression model. 
Data 
Data used for this thesis come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START). The GTD is an open-source database that includes information 
on domestic and international terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2018.  Collectors seek out 
a variety of sources to include in the database, such as media articles, electronic news 
archives, available data sets, and secondary source materials like books, journals, and 
legal documents (START, 2019). Throughout the GTD’s history, the data were 
collected by different groups that relied on different protocols, thus influencing the 





was collected in real time by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service from 1970 to 
1997. Phase two was collected retrospectively by the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies from January 1998 to March 2008. Phase three was collected 
prospectively by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups from April 2008 to 
2011. Phase four (the current phase) is collected in real time by START since 2012. 
The last phase uses machine learning to search among 55,000 unique sources per day 
to determine if an article is reporting information about a terrorist incident (Jensen, 
2013). Access to these technology advancements has helped increase awareness of 
terrorist attacks and increased confidence that all terrorist incidents are being reported 
in the GTD. The different data collection periods might result in inconsistent data 
acquisition, requiring me to include control variables in the analysis for the GTD 
collection periods.  
Terrorism in the GTD is defined as, “the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence to attain political, economic, religious, or social goals through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). For an incident to have been 
included in the dataset, it must contain the following three elements:  
I. The incident was intentional (the result of a conscious calculation on 
the part of the perpetrator).  
II. The incident included some observable level of violence or the threat 
of violence.  
III. The perpetrator of the incident was a sub-national actor.  
In addition to these three criteria, two of the following three conditions must 





I. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal.  
II. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, 
or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other 
than the immediate victims  
III. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities.  
In total, there are 2,486 terrorist attacks occurring in Lebanon between the 
years of 1970 to 2018 in the GTD.  I will filter on incidents that meet the third 
additional criteria, which is the terrorist incident must be outside the context of 
legitimate warfare activities. One of the time periods included in the analysis is 
during Lebanon’s civil war. I want to exclude the attacks that are justified by the civil 
war and focus on the terrorist attacks that were purposely caused to optimize the 
terrorist organizations’ utility functions. There is a total of 1,665 terrorist incidents 
occurring in Lebanon that will be used in the analysis. 
The GTD will provide the necessary data on the terrorist incidents occurring 
in Lebanon to understand why targeting strategies change over time. The dependent 
variable of interest measures the general target type for each terrorist incident in 
Lebanon from 1970 to 2018. Target types included in the GTD are listed as business, 
government (general), police, military, airports & aircraft, government (diplomatic), 
educational institution, food or water supply, journalists & media, maritime, NGO 
(non-governmental organizations), private citizens & property, religious 





transportation (other than aviation) unknown, utilities, and violent political parties. I 
will sort these specific target types into the general categories of terrorist 
organization, foreign entity, government, and soft targets. A soft target is a group or 
location that has low protection and is easily accessible, resulting in the target being 
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Table 1 demonstrates how the specific target 
types in the GTD are categorized into general target types for the dependent variable. 
All the specific target types included in the general category of soft targets in table 1 
fit this description because they are all public places that are more vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. I will be analyzing the target type of each terrorist attack reported in 
the GTD and will observe how the overall selection of specific target types changes 
over the three major time periods.   
Table 1: Classifying the Specific Target Type by the General Target Type for the 
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In the GTD, the dependent variable of target types can have up to three 
potential target types identified for each terrorist attack. In order to construct a 
categorical dependent variable with mutually exclusive targets, I will need to 
reconcile those attacks which include multiple target types across categories (e.g., 
government and foreign entity) to identify the primary target type. I will read the full 
case and collect additional details to fully understand the terrorist attack. There are 
several potential coding principles I can use when determining my primary targeting 
type. One potential way is to identify the hardest reaching target for the specific 
terrorist attack. The more effort a terrorist organization must exert to attack a target 
indicates that the target is more valuable to the terrorist organization and their goals 
(Asal, Rethemeyer, Anderson, Stein, Rizzo, & Rozea, 2009; Drake, 1998; Polo, 
2019). For example, if a Lebanese government official was attacked at their home and 
other civilians in the area were also harmed, the primary target type would be 
government. The government is a harder to reach target than a public institution. 
Successfully attacking the government requires more time, effort, and resources than 
attacking an easily accessible soft target (Polo, 2019).  
Another potential way to identify the primary target is based on the spatial 
context of the terrorist incident. For example, if a terrorist attack occurred at a mall 





primary target type would be soft target because the attack occurred in a public area 
and the terrorist organization was targeting civilians. Even though the terrorist was 
harmed during the attack, it appears the Lebanese civilians were the primary target 
instead of the one terrorist that was coincidently visiting the mall at that time.  
I will also randomly assign the primary target classification when there are 
multiple targets identified using a random number generator. By arbitrarily assigning 
the target classification, I can compare the different coding principles. I will run my 
models using the three coding methods to determine if using any of the coding 
principles influences my results.  
Strengths of the GTD 
There are several strengths to using the Global Terrorism Database, as 
discussed previously by LaFree and Dugan (2007). First, the GTD includes domestic 
and international terrorism incidents for all years, which is more expansive than other 
data sources that only collect information on transnational terrorism (e.g., ITERATE, 
RAND prior to 1998). The inclusion of domestic attacks is crucial for the proposed 
thesis study because some of my hypotheses focus on attacks by Lebanese groups on 
Lebanese targets in Lebanon (i.e., domestic attacks). Second, the GTD provides 48 
years of terrorist incident information. Based on the comprehensiveness of the 
database, I can view the number of terrorist attacks occurring before, during, and after 
the civil war, as well as after state failure for Lebanon. Figure 1 illustrates a timeline 
of all terrorist attacks occurring in Lebanon during the study period. Third, 
improvements in technology have eased the collection of information on terrorist 





incidents of terrorism reported in the news are being included in the GTD (Dugan & 
Distler, 2016). Even though the GTD is the best available database for my proposed 
thesis, there are still some limitations of the GTD that need to be addressed.  
 
Limitations of the GTD 
Because the GTD relies on open sources, it suffers from several limitations 
that will affect the validity of this research (Dugan & Distler, 2016). First, multiple 
sources reporting on the same incident has resulted in some inconsistences about the 
facts of the terrorist attack. Currently, the GTD team uses specific coding rules if 
sources are reporting conflicting information on the intended target to determine 
which source is the most accurate. The team places greater weight on the sources that 
are historically more valid, the source that is the most recently updated, and if the 
same target type is reported across multiple sources (Dugan & Distler, 2016; LaFree, 
Dugan, & Miller, 2015). If none of the coding rules are satisfied, the GTD team uses 
the lowest reasonable value for the variable, in an effort to have the most conservative 
estimate possible (Dugan & Distler, 2016). By having conservative estimates, this 
could bias my estimates of my hypotheses and could result in me incorrectly rejecting 
my hypotheses.  
Second, there is a bias toward newsworthy events, which can lead to sources 
under-reporting smaller attacks. The terrorist organization target category may be 
consistently under-reported across all time periods. Terrorist attacks against other 
terrorist organizations may not be covered by media sources because attacks against 





This would bias my estimate of hypothesis one toward zero and could result in me 
incorrectly rejecting hypothesis 1.  
Third, there are inconsistencies over time in data collection. As discussed in 
the data section, the GTD has had four different data collection periods, resulting in 
potentially inconsistent data acquisition and reporting procedures of terrorist attacks. 
For example, in phase 2, the data was collected retrospectively rather than in real 
time. By collecting data retrospectively, certain sources became unavailable, leading 
to either missing incidents or missing data for the attacks. It is difficult to assess 
whether differences in the number of attacks over time are due to changes in the 
actual number of attacks or changes in the data collection strategy. In order to 
overcome these inconsistencies, I will be incorporating control variables to account 
for the differences across the data collection periods. By controlling for the data 
collection periods, the estimates will not be affected by the variations in information 
provided throughout each of the data collection periods. Even though I am including 
these control variables, I could still potentially be missing cases from data collection 
period 2. This could bias my estimates of hypotheses two and three toward zero 
because phase 2 starts during time period 2 and ends during time period 3.  
Finally, there is missing data for 1993 due to the Pinkerton Global Intelligence 
Services (PGIS) misplacing the data before the START center gained control of the 
data. This year has been excluded from the present analysis.  
Dependent Variable 
In alignment with the three hypotheses, I will create a categorical dependent 





types. The general target type categories are terrorist organizations, foreign entity, 
government, and soft targets. The soft target category will be the reference category 
for the analysis. Table 1 demonstrates how the specific target types in the GTD are 
categorized into general target types for the dependent variable. In addition to the 
classification of specific target types into general target types, there are additional 
coding rules for the foreign entity and government target types. For the foreign entity 
target type, the nationality of the target cannot be Lebanese. For the government 
target type, the nationality of the target must be listed as Lebanese. The complete list 
of variables and their operationalization can be found in table 2. 




Dependent Variable   
    Target Type [0, 3] General category of the target attacked during 
the terrorist incident.  
 
0 if it was a soft target, 1 if it was a terrorist 
organization, 2 if was a foreign entity, and 3 
if it was the government.  
Independent Variables   
    During Civil War 0, 1 Terrorist attacks occurring from April 13, 
1975 to October 13, 1990.  
    After Civil War 
    (Prior to State Failure) 
0, 1 Terrorist attacks occurring from October 14, 
1990 to April 30, 2005. Also, excluding all 
terrorist attacks occurring in 1993. 
    After State Failure 0, 1 Terrorist attacks occurring from May 1, 2005 
to December 31, 2018.    
Control Variables   
    Unattributed 0, 1 The perpetrator of the terrorist attack is 
unknown.  
    Ideology   
        Religious 0, 1 The ideology of the organization is religious. 






        Political 0, 1 The ideology of the organization is political.  
    Collection Period   
        GTD1 0, 1 Information on terrorist incident was 
collected in phase 1 of the GTD. 
        GTD2 0, 1 Information on terrorist incident was 
collected in phase 2 of the GTD. 
        GTD3 0, 1 Information on terrorist incident was 
collected in phase 3 of the GTD. 
        GTD4 0, 1 Information on terrorist incident was 
collected in phase 4 of the GTD. 
Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variables of interest are significant time period’s in 
Lebanon’s history.  I will create dichotomous measures for each of the time periods, 
in which 0 indicates that the terrorist attack did not occur during the specified time 
period and 1 indicates that the terrorist attack did occur (see Table 2 for the variable 
descriptions).  
Rather than focusing on specific events that triggered different targeting 
strategies, I focus on three broader time periods in Lebanon’s history (during the civil 
war, after the civil war but prior to state failure, and after state failure) and how these 
time periods effect terrorist targeting strategies. Appendix B provides a summary 
timeline of key moments in Lebanese history and the time periods these events 
occurred. During the civil war, tension primarily existed between different religious 
groups, militias, and terrorist organizations, resulting in the major historical events 
and violent conflicts occurring between these different groups. After the civil war 
(but before state failure), the conflict and tension was resolved between the groups 
due to the Lebanese government fixing the power imbalances between the Maronite 





governments and Lebanese citizens increased due to the continued occupation and 
control by foreign governments in Lebanon. The major historical events and violent 
conflicts during this time were primarily based on driving foreign governments from 
the country. For example, previous enemies (Maronite Christians, Sunnis, and Shias) 
worked together in 2005 to engage in daily protests of Syria’s continued occupation 
of Lebanon (Maksoud et al., 2020). After the foreign governments ended their 
occupation of Lebanon, the conflict and tension between foreign governments and the 
Lebanese was resolved. However, the tension and conflict between the Lebanese 
government and other Lebanese ruling forces increased due to the need to fill the 
vacated positions of power that was formerly controlled by foreign governments.  
The major historical events and violent conflicts during this time were focused 
on different groups gaining political power. Each time period is defined by a conflict 
between different groups, resulting in similar historical events revolving around the 
primary conflict of the time. Due to each time period having a similar pattern in 
historical events, I am using the broader time periods instead of specific historical 
events in my study. I want to observe how the overall conflict of each time period 
influences the overall terrorist targeting strategies rather than focusing on individual 
historical events and how these events affect individual terrorist organizations in 
different ways.  
Control Variables 
The proposed control variables are characteristics of terrorist organizations 
that influence the choices these organizations make, which need to be controlled to 





Ideally, I would like to control for a variety of terrorist organization level 
characteristics such as size, primary ideology, lethality, age, and duration of 
organization. However, due to the large number of terrorist attacks that are 
unattributed to a perpetrator, I am unable to control for many of these organization 
characteristics.2 Based on the available GTD data, I include control variables for if 
the perpetrator is unknown, the ideology of the terrorist organization, and the GTD 
data collection periods. Detailed descriptions and operationalizations of the control 
variables can be found above in table 2.  
The first proposed control variable included in the analysis is if the terrorist 
attack is unattributed to a perpetrator. I will create a dichotomous measure for the 
perpetrator variable, in which 0 indicates that the perpetrator of the terrorist attack is 
known and 1 indicates that there is no perpetrator attributed to the attack. There are 
many terrorist incidents included in the GTD that do not have a perpetrator. As 
previously mentioned, I am interested in changes to the collective targeting strategies 
rather than a specific terrorist organization’s strategies. By controlling for the types of 
organizations, I will be able to focus my analysis on the similar targeting decisions 
for all terrorist organizations. By controlling for the unattributed perpetrator, my 
results will not be negatively influenced by this variable, which is not contributing to 
my hypotheses.    
Another control variable is the ideology of the terrorist organization including 
the categories of religious, nationalist, and political. I will create dichotomous 
 
2 I attempted to include information from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) database on 
organization level characteristics (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2015). However, the database only had 





measures for each of the primary ideologies, in which 0 indicates that the terrorist 
organization is not the specific ideology and 1 indicates that the organization is the 
specific ideology. These variables are not mutually exclusive, due to terrorist 
organizations potentially identifying as multiple ideologies. Tension and conflict 
between different ideologies has had a major impact on Lebanon’s history, 
specifically the conflict between the religious groups of Maronite Christians, Sunnis, 
and Shias which lead to Lebanon’s civil war. A terrorist organization’s ideology has a 
direct impact on which targeting categories appear to be in opposition to the 
organizations’ goals, thus resulting in target selection of the individuals who appear 
to be an enemy of the organization and most threaten their primary goal of survival 
(Drake, 1998). Also, the targeting patterns of different ideology groups may vary over 
time due to changes in which targeting categories are viewed as the organizations’ 
enemies.  
The final control variable is related to the GTD collection periods. Throughout 
the GTD’s history, there has been four different data collection teams, leading to 
differences in how the data were collected. I will create dichotomous measures for 
each of the data collection time periods, in which 0 indicates that the specific data 
collection team did not compile information on the terrorist incident and 1 indicates it 
was the specific the data collection team. Information on each terrorist attack will 
vary based on which collection team researched the incident, meaning that the 
differences in collection teams and types of collection are related to terrorist targeting 







Because the dependent variable is a categorical variable, the proposed thesis 
will use multinominal logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between 
terrorist targeting choices and the time period of the terrorist attack, while controlling 
for other possible explanations. Multinominal logistic regression models are used to 
estimate the marginal effects of the primary independent variables on the probability 
of the different outcomes for the dependent variable. In the context of this thesis, I 
will estimate how the predicted probabilities of targeting choices change for each 
time period. The dependent variable of targeting choices is coded as:  
𝑌𝑖 = {
0 if soft target
1 if terrorist organization
2 if foreign entity
3 if government
 






 ,  k=1,2,3 (3) 
where  
𝑿𝜷𝒌 = 𝛽0𝑘 +  𝛽1𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 +  𝛽2𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 +
 𝛽3𝑘𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 3 +  𝛽4𝑘 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 
Time period 1 includes terrorist attacks occurring during the civil war. Time 
period 2 includes terrorist attacks occurring after the civil war. Time period 3 includes 
terrorist attacks occurring after state failure. Controls include unattributed perpetrator, 
the ideology of the terrorist organization, and the GTD data collection periods. To test 
hypothesis 1, the estimate would appear as:  





If hypothesis 1 is supported, the predicted probability of target type 1 (terrorist 
organizations) will be the greatest for time period 1, when compared to all other time 
periods (𝛽2 & 𝛽3). To test hypothesis 2, the estimate would appear as:  
Pr(Y=2) = 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2 > (𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 & 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 3)  (5) 
If hypothesis 2 is supported, the predicted probability of target type 2 (foreign 
entity) will be the greatest for time period 2, when compared to all other time periods 
(𝛽1 & 𝛽3). To test hypothesis 3, the estimate would appear as: 
Pr(Y=3) = 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 3 > (𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1 & 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 2)  (6)  
If hypothesis 3 is supported, the predicted probability of target type 3 
(government) will be the greatest for time period 3, when compared to all other time 








Chapter 4: Results 
In this chapter, I discuss the coding principles and the number of terrorist 
attacks classified by each of the primary targeting types. I present the descriptive 
statistics to summarize the primary dependent and independent variables. I then 
present the results of the multinominal logistic regression models. The results are then 
interpreted and applied to the three hypotheses. 
Application of Coding Principles 
As identified in the data section, I applied the three coding principles to 
determine the primary target type of the terrorist attacks which included multiple 
target types. There were 63 terrorist attacks that were missing the target type 
identification, resulting with the total number of valid values for the dependent 
variable equaling 1,665. Figure 2 displays the number of terrorist attacks classified by 
the primary targeting type, according to each coding principle. Overall, the number of 
terrorist attacks by targeting type were somewhat consistent over the three coding 
principles, suggesting that the coding principle used should not impact the analysis. 
Due to these consistencies, I discuss the model results for coding principle 1 (hardest 
to reach) below and include the results for coding principles 2 (spatial context) and 3 














Figures 3 displays the changes in the dependent variable (targeting types) 
across the three time periods for coding principle 1 (hardest to reach). Figure 4 
presents the proportions of total terrorist attacks during each time period that are 
attributed to each target type. Appendix C includes the changes in targeting types 
across the three time periods and the proportions of total terrorist attacks during each 
time period by target type for coding principles 2 (spatial context) and 3 (random). 
Overall, the number of terrorist attacks for each target type across time periods are 
approximately the same for each of the three coding principles.  
The number of attacks against soft targets during the civil war was 455, 
decreased to 118 attacks after the civil war, and increased to 271 attacks after state 
failure. The number of attacks against terrorist organizations during the civil war was 
89, increased to 112 attacks after the civil war, and decreased to 40 attacks after state 
failure. The number of attacks against foreign entities during the civil war was 229, 
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failure. The number of attacks against the government during the civil war was 130, 
decreased to 25 attacks after the civil war, and increased to 69 attacks after state 
failure. The targeting patterns for each time period do not appear to align with the 
hypotheses, except for the government target type. As identified in figure 4, the 
proportion of terrorist attacks against the government target type was the largest after 
state failure, when compared to attacks against terrorist organizations and foreign 
entities, as predicted in hypothesis 3.  








































































Figure 4: Proportion of Total Terrorist Attacks During Each Time Period 
Attributed to Target Type (Coding Principle 1 - Hardest to Reach) 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics which consists of the means, standard 
deviations, and the minimum and maximum values for the primary independent 
variables. Time period 1 variable (during the civil war) has a mean of 0.542 and a 
standard deviation of 0.498. These descriptive statistics suggest that 54.2% of the 
total number of terrorist attacks included in the sample occurred during the civil war. 
Time period 2 variable (after civil war) has a mean of 0.198 and a standard deviation 
of 0.397 – indicating that 19.8% of the total terrorist attacks occurred after the civil 
war but prior to state failure. Time period 3 (after state failure) has a mean of 0.263 
and a standard deviation of 0.429 – indicating that 26.3% of the total terrorist attacks 
occurred after state failure.  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Time Periods      
    During Civil War 1665 0.542 0.498 0 1 











































    After State 
Failure 
1665 0.263 0.429 0 1 
 
Unattributed 1665 0.704 0.456 0 1 
Ideology      
    Religious 1665 0.194 0.396 0 1 
    Political 1665 0.028 0.165 0 1 
    Nationalist     1665 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Collection Periods      
    GTD1 1665 0.697 0.460 0 1 
    GTD2 1665 0.086 0.280 0 1 
    GTD3 1665 0.040 0.197 0 1 
    GTD4 1665 0.177 0.382 0 1 
 
 
Table 3 also provides the descriptive statistics for the control variables. The 
unattributed variable (the perpetrator is unknown) has a mean of 0.704 and a standard 
deviation of 0.456 – indicating that 70.4% of the total terrorist attacks had an 
unattributed perpetrator. The religious ideology variable has a mean of 0.194 and a 
standard deviation of 0.396 – indicating that 19.4% of the total terrorist attacks were 
conducted by a religious terrorist organization. The political ideology variable has a 
mean of 0.028 and a standard deviation of 0.165 – indicating that 2.8% of the total 
terrorist attacks were conducted by a political terrorist organization. The nationalist 
ideology variable has a mean of 0.074 and a standard deviation of 0.262 – indicating 
that 7.4% of the total terrorist attacks were conducted by a nationalist terrorist 
organization. When the perpetrator was known for 493 terrorist attacks, 323 (63.09%) 
of the attacks were by a religious group, 47 (9.53%) of the attacks were by a political 
group, and 123 (24.95%) of the attacks were by a nationalist group. The GTD 
collection period 1 has a mean of 0.697 and a standard deviation of 0.460 – indicating 
that 69.7% of the total terrorist attacks occurred during collection period 1. The GTD 





that 8.6% of the total terrorist attacks occurred during collection period 2. The GTD 
collection period 3 has a mean of 0.040 and a standard deviation of 0.197 – indicating 
that 4.0% of the total terrorist attacks occurred during collection period 3. The GTD 
collection period 4 has a mean of 0.177 and a standard deviation of 0.382 – indicating 
that 17.7% of the total terrorist attacks occurred during collection period 4.  
Multinominal Logistic Results  
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates and standard errors for the 
multinominal logistic regression model for coding principle 1 (hardest to reach). 
Within the table is a set of estimates for each targeting outcome, indicating the 
changes in predicted logged odds for the targeting types based on each of the 
independent and control variables. Results are interpreted using marginal effects and 
standard errors in table 5 to estimate the probability of each targeting outcome during 
the civil war, after the civil war, and after state failure. Comparing the results for 
coding principles 1 through 3, the patterns in predicted target types and application to 
the hypotheses remained consistent for all coding principles. Due to the consistencies, 
I include the coefficient estimates, marginal effects, and standard errors for the 
multinominal logistic regression models for coding principles 2 (spatial context) and 
3 (random) in Appendix D and focus on interpreting results for coding principle 1 
(hardest to reach) for the hypotheses and control variable interpretation sections. For 
all three analyses, the base outcome for the dependent variable is soft target. The 
results are interpreted and applied to my hypotheses.  
Table 4: Multinominal Logistic Coefficients and (SE) Predicting Target Types – 
Coding Principle 1 (Hardest to Reach) 
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Time Periods    
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Note: * p-value≤ 0.05; **p-value≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests). 
 
Table 5: Marginal Effects and (SE) of Predicted Target Types – Coding 
Principle 1 (Hardest to Reach) 









Time Periods    


















    
Control Variables    
    Unattributed 0.048 
(0.785) 















(2.39) (0.303) (0.694) 






    Collection Period 2 -0.055 
(0.932) 










    Collection Period 4 0.055 
(0.865) 





Note: * p-value≤ 0.05; **p-value≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests). 
 
 Hypothesis 1 
For hypothesis 1 to be supported, during the civil war, terrorist organizations 
must have the highest probability of being targeted, net other factors. To test 
hypothesis 1, I conduct Wald hypothesis tests to compare the coefficients of table 4 
for terrorist organization target type to the coefficients for target types foreign entity 
and government. The hypothesis tests were not statistically significant, indicating that 
attacks occurring during the civil war were not more likely to have a target type of 
terrorist organization compared to the target types of foreign entity or government. 
These results indicate that hypothesis 1 is not supported. Even though hypothesis 1 is 
not supported, I compare the marginal effects reported in table 5 of terrorist 
organization to foreign entity and government during the civil war to see if hypothesis 
1 would have been supported if the results were statistically significant.  
To assess whether the marginal effects are aligned with hypothesis 1, the 
marginal effects of the predicted probabilities for terrorist organizations must be 
highest during the civil war, compared to the predicted probabilities of target types 
foreign entity and government. Based on the results of table 5, during the civil war, 





decreased by 0.294 for a foreign entity, and increased by 0.53 for the government. 
This indicates that hypothesis 1 is not supported because during the civil war, the 
government target type is the most likely to be targeted when compared to the other 
target types, instead of terrorist organization being the most likely to be targeted as 
predicted by hypothesis 1. Also, when comparing the marginal effects of terrorist 
organization across the time periods relative to soft targets, terrorist organizations are 
most likely to be targeted after the civil war when compared to during the civil war 
and after state failure, instead of being most likely to be targeted during the civil war 
as predicted by hypothesis 1.  
 Hypothesis 2 
For hypothesis 2 to be supported, after the civil war, foreign entities must 
have the highest probability of being targeted, net other factors. To test hypothesis 2, 
I conduct Wald hypothesis tests to compare the coefficients of table 4 for foreign 
entity target type to the coefficients for target types terrorist organization and 
government. The hypothesis tests were not statistically significant, indicating that 
attacks occurring after the civil war were not more likely to have a target type of 
foreign entity compared to the target types of terrorist organization or government. 
These results indicate that hypothesis 2 is not supported. Even though hypothesis 2 is 
not supported, I compare the marginal effects reported in table 5 of foreign entity to 
terrorist organization and government after the civil war to see if hypothesis 2 would 
have been supported if the results were statistically significant.  
To assess whether the marginal effects are aligned with hypothesis 2, the 





after the civil war, compared to the predicted probabilities of target types terrorist 
organization and government. Based on the results of table 5, after the civil war, the 
probability that a terrorist organization was targeted decreased by 0.263, it increased 
by 0.807 for a foreign entity, and increased by 0.181 for the government. This 
indicates that hypothesis 2 is not supported because after the civil war, the terrorist 
organization target type is the most likely to be targeted when compared to the other 
target types, instead of foreign entity being the most likely to be targeted as predicted 
by hypothesis 2. Also, when comparing the marginal effects of foreign entity across 
the time periods relative to soft targets, the probabilities that foreign entities were 
targeted were lower for all three time periods, instead of being more likely to be 
targeted after the civil war as predicted by hypothesis 2.  
 Hypothesis 3 
For hypothesis 3 to be supported, after state failure, the government must have 
the highest probability of being targeted, net other factors. To test hypothesis 3, I 
conduct Wald hypothesis tests to compare the coefficients of table 4 for government 
target type to the coefficients for target types terrorist organization and foreign entity. 
The hypothesis tests were not statistically significant, indicating that attacks occurring 
after state failure were not more likely to have a target type of government compared 
to the target types of terrorist organization or foreign entity. These results indicate 
that hypothesis 3 is not supported. Even though hypothesis 3 is not supported, I 
compare the marginal effects reported in table 5 of government to terrorist 
organization and foreign entity after state failure to see if hypothesis 3 would have 





To assess whether the marginal effects are aligned with hypothesis 3, the 
marginal effects of the predicted probabilities for the government must be highest 
after state failure, compared to the predicted probabilities of target types terrorist 
organization and foreign entity. Based on the results of table 5, after state failure, the 
probability that the government was targeted increased by 0.789, it increased by 
0.205 for terrorist organization, and decreased by 0.291 for foreign entity. This 
indicates that hypothesis 3 would have been supported if the results were statistically 
significant because after state failure, the government target type is the most likely to 
be targeted when compared to the other target types. Also, when comparing the 
marginal effects of government across the time periods relative to soft targets, the 
government is most likely to be targeted after state failure when compared to during 
the civil war and after the civil war, as predicted by hypothesis 3.  
 Model Results of Control Variables 
 Next, I discuss the control variables and identify which variables are 
significant in the models. I conduct Wald hypothesis tests to compare the coefficient 
estimates from table 4 for each control variable to determine if there are any 
statistically significant differences between the three different target types. I also 
tested to see if the effects on terrorist organizations compared to foreign entities, 
terrorist organizations compared to the government, and foreign entities compared to 
the government were significantly different for each of the control variables. Results 
are interpreted using marginal effects and standard errors in table 5 to estimate the 





Based on the marginal effects of table 5, the unattributed attacks are most 
likely to target terrorist organizations and least likely to attack foreign entities. The 
Wald hypothesis tests are statistically significant, indicating that the relationship 
between terrorist organizations, foreign entities, and government target types 
represented in the model for unattributed attacks is statistically significant. All three 
ideologies are more likely to target other terrorist organizations relative to foreign 
entities and government. The Wald hypothesis tests are statistically significant when 
comparing the coefficient estimates of terrorist organization to foreign entity. This 
means that the relationship between terrorist organizations and foreign entities 
represented in the model for all ideology groups is statistically significant. Finally, 
attacks occurring in GTD collection period 2 are most likely to target foreign entities 
relative to terrorist organizations and government. The Wald hypothesis tests are 
statistically significant when comparing the coefficient estimates of foreign entity to 
terrorist organization. This means that the relationship between terrorist organizations 
and foreign entities represented in the model for GTD collection period 2 is 
statistically significant. Attacks occurring in GTD collection periods 3 and 4 are most 
likely to target terrorist organizations relative to foreign entities and government, but 









Chapter 5: Discussion 
Expanding upon previous research that examined terrorist targeting strategies, 
this study used Becker’s (1968) concept of utility functions and Crenshaw’s (1987) 
arguments to determine if terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon changed their 
targeting decisions based on which entity was the most threatening to their survival. 
Overall, there was no support found for any of the hypotheses and the results were not 
statistically significant. No support was found for the first hypothesis that predicted 
terrorist organizations would have the highest probability of being targeted during the 
civil war. No support was found for the second hypothesis that predicted foreign 
entities would have the highest probability of being targeted after the civil war (but 
prior to state failure). No support was found for the third hypothesis that predicted the 
Lebanese government would have the highest probability of being targeted after state 
failure. Even though my hypotheses were not supported or statistically significant, I 
decided to analyze the targeting patterns of attacks with a known perpetrator to 
determine if the hypothesized patterns existed for these groups. 
Additional Descriptive Analysis for Known Perpetrators 
Many of the cases included in the analysis had an unknown perpetrator (1,041 
terrorist attacks had an unknown perpetrator out of 1,665 total attacks). For the 
purposes of my analysis, I controlled for the unknown perpetrator but was unable to 
study individual terrorist organizations and how their targeting decisions may be 
different than the hypothesized patterns. The targeting decisions of terrorist 
organizations may not be rational or different terrorist organizations may have other 





pattern. I studied the patterns of targeting for each of the ideologies (religious, 
political, and nationalist) by observing the number of terrorist attacks for the primary 
target types during each of the time periods. I also analyzed the targeting patterns for 
the terrorist organization Hezbollah because of its substantial engagement in terrorist 
activity throughout Lebanon’s history and its unusual connection to Iran, leading to 
different incentives of this terrorist organization compared to other religious based 
terrorist organizations. In order to analyze attacks by Hezbollah, I created a new 
dichotomous variable called Hezbollah, which coded all attacks perpetrated by 
Hezbollah as 1 and all other attacks as 0.  
Figures 5-8 present the changes across time periods in number of terrorist 
attacks by each ideology group (Religious, Hezbollah, Political, and Nationalist) for 
each target type. I then conducted Wald hypothesis tests to compare target types for 
each of the ideology variables to see if any of the relationships were statistically 
significant. Tables 6-9 present the proportion of terrorist attacks with a specific target 
type across time period, conditional on the ideology group. Comparing the results for 
coding principles 1 through 3, the patterns in predicted target types remained 
consistent for all coding principles. Due to the consistencies, I include the figures and 
predicted proportions for coding principles 2 (spatial context) and 3 (random) in 
Appendix E and focus on interpreting results for coding principle 1 (hardest to reach).  
Before presenting the results of the descriptive analyses, I indicate how the 
predicted probabilities of targeting types should change across time periods for the 
ideology variables. As discussed previously, tension and conflict between religious 





on hypothesis 1, religious groups and Hezbollah must target terrorist organizations 
the most during the civil war. Nationalist terrorists’ objectives focus on gaining 
autonomy and could result in the organizations fighting against foreign groups that 
hold political or economic power in the nationalists’ country (Joyce & Wain, 2014). 
This objective aligns perfectly with the predicted shift in tension and conflict for 
Lebanon after the civil war due to the continued occupation by foreign governments. 
Based on hypothesis 2, nationalist groups must target foreign entities the most after 
the civil war. After state failure, tension and conflicted was predicted to shift between 
terrorist organizations and the Lebanese government due to terrorist organizations 
attempting to gain political power and control. Based on hypothesis 3, political 
groups must target the government the most after state failure.  
Figure 5: Soft Targets by Ideology Group for Each Time Period (Coding 
Principle 1 – Hardest to Reach) 
 
 
Table 6: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Soft Target Type by Time 
Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 1 - Hardest to Reach) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.187 0.033 0.780 
















































Political 0.944 0.000 0.056 
Nationalist 0.893 0.018 0.089 
 
 
Figure 6: Terrorist Organization Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time 




Table 7: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Terrorist Organization Target 
Type by Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 1 - 
Hardest to Reach) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.154 0.000 0.846 
Hezbollah 0.077 0.908 0.015 
Political 0.556 0.333 0.111 
























































Figure 7: Foreign Entity Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 
(Coding Principle 1 – Hardest to Reach) 
 
 
Table 8: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Foreign Entity Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 1 - Hardest to 
Reach) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.579 0.053 0.368 
Hezbollah 0.400 0.580 0.020 
Political 0.833 0.083 0.083 
Nationalist 0.927 0.073 0.000 
 
Figure 8: Government Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 





























































































Table 9: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Government Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 1 - Hardest to 
Reach) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.421 0.000 0.579 
Hezbollah 0.235 0.471 0.294 
Political 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Nationalist 0.750 0.000 0.250 
 
After conducting the Wald hypothesis tests to compare the targeting types for 
each ideology variable, the hypothesis tests were not statistically significant. This 
indicates that any results found to support the hypotheses are not statistically 
significant. Even though my results are not significant, I will compare the ideology 
groups to determine if they followed the predicted targeting patterns of hypotheses 1 
through 3. The predicted targeting patterns are not supported for any of the ideology 
groups. Based on the results of figure 7, the nationalist groups targeted terrorist 
organizations the most during the civil war, instead of religious groups and Hezbollah 
as predicted by hypothesis 1. Religious groups targeted terrorist organizations the 
most after state failure and Hezbollah targeted terrorist organizations the most after 
the civil war. Based on the results of figure 8, Hezbollah targeted foreign entities the 
most after the civil war, instead of nationalist groups as predicted by hypothesis 2. 
Nationalist groups targeted foreign entities the most during the civil war. Based on 
the results of figure 9, religious groups targeted the government the most after state 
failure, instead of political groups as predicted by hypothesis 3. Political groups 







As previously discussed, some researchers suggest that the decision to engage 
in terrorism is not rational because the cost of committing the attack is high and the 
benefit gained from the attack is low (Abrahms, 2004, 2006, 2008; Calhoun, 2002; 
Gupta, 2008; Jenkins, 2006). For example, researchers indicate that individuals who 
sacrifice themselves as suicide bombers are irrational. Based on a rationality 
perspective, the cost of committing the crime (losing their life) is much greater than 
the potential benefits of the crime (the individual sacrifices themselves for a higher 
cause or to help the terrorist organization spread their message) (Perry & Hasisi, 
2015). However, Perry and Hasisi (2015) applied the rational choice theory to 
understand the motivations of jihadist suicide terrorism. They found that the behavior 
was driven by maximizing the future self-gratifying benefits rather than the individual 
committing the attack for altruistic reasons (Perry & Hasisi, 2015). Thus, the terrorist 
behavior that appears to lack any rational reasoning can be explained using the 
rational choice arguments.  
Related to the rationality argument, the results of my thesis suggest that the 
predicted targeting patterns of terrorist organizations operating in Lebanon were not 
proven correct. My thesis showed that the target types that appeared to be the most 
threatening to the terrorist organizations’ survival in each time period did not have an 
impact on targeting strategies. Even though my results did not support my 
hypothesized targeting patterns, this does not indicate that targeting strategies or 
terrorism in general is irrational. Instead, my results suggest that there could be other 
factors that influence target selection besides threats to survival or the predicted 





terrorist organizations operating in other countries. More research is needed to 
determine the rationality of terrorism and how ideas from the rational choice theory 
are related to terrorist targeting decisions. 
Suggestions for a stronger analysis include incorporating more variables to 
control for group characteristics. Currently, my analysis only includes group level 
control variables for if there is an unattributed perpetrator and organization’s 
ideology. Even with these control variables, many of the terrorist attacks in the 
analysis have an unknown perpetrator, resulting in a lack of information on group 
characteristics. Although I performed descriptive analyses for terrorist attacks with a 
known perpetrator to help account for group differences, I still do not have enough 
information to determine how nuanced differences between groups impacts targeting 
strategies.   
Future analyses should incorporate other datasets with terrorist group 
characteristics. One potential database is the newly created Extended Data on 
Terrorist Groups (EDTG) (Hou, Gaibulloev, and Sandler, 2019). This dataset is 
linked to terrorist groups and attacks in the GTD and provides terrorist group 
variables. Group variables include ideology, main goals, start date, duration, base 
country, attack diversity, peak size, state sponsorship of groups, interface with other 
terrorist groups, supply of social services, holding of territory, and group lethality and 
productivity. Incorporating these measures would allow me to account for differences 
in group characteristics between terrorist organizations, allowing for better 





Additional suggestions include incorporating more measures for state failure. 
The current analysis includes a dichotomous measure of state failure to determine 
which terrorist attacks will be classified under the third time period (after state 
failure). State failure does not occur overnight, but instead the progression to state 
failure takes years to occur. Future analyses should include a measure to track the 
progression of state failure over time in Lebanon to see how this impacts targeting 
strategies. I would predict that further progression to state failure would result in 
weakened control by the government and other ruling parties, thus resulting in 
increased chances of survival for terrorist organizations and more opportunities for 
these organizations to gain power and control in Lebanon by engaging in more 
terrorist attacks.  
Future research should test to see if the hypothesized patterns in targeting 
decisions can be applied to other countries. Potential countries for future analyses 
include Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, and Turkey due to similar country 
characteristics. These countries have all faced or are currently facing massive internal 
conflicts, have a substantial number of terrorist attacks, and have characteristics 
predictive of state failure. Even though the hypotheses were not supported for 
terrorist behavior in Lebanon, the targeting strategies could be significant for another 
country that shares similar characteristics to Lebanon, especially if the analyses 
control for more group characteristics.  
Nonetheless, while this analysis is limited, this thesis highlights the 
importance of understanding terrorist targeting decisions. This thesis also brings a 





organizations and how they change based on which target appears the most 
threatening to terrorist organization’s survival. While the causal mechanisms are still 
unclear, understanding how threats to a terrorist organizations’ survival impacts 
terrorist targeting strategies should be tested further in analyses with more terrorist 
group characteristics and for other countries. If proven correct, this relationship 
should be taken into consideration when creating counter-terrorism policies for other 
























Appendix A: Extended Details on the Incidents Leading to Lebanon’s Civil War 
1958 Lebanon Crisis: Sunnis and Shias wanted the Lebanese government to 
join the United Arab Republic (the proposed country based on the unification of Syria 
and Egypt) (Harris, 2012). Maronite Christians wanted Lebanon to remain 
independent and keep Lebanon aligned with Western powers. Fearing the overthrown 
of the government by Lebanese Muslims, President Camille Chamoune asked for 
U.S. intervention to preserve Lebanon’s independence under the new Eisenhower 
Doctrine. This led to U.S. marines landing in Beirut and to the election of General 
Fuad Chehab as the next Lebanese president, in an attempt to appease Muslim anger 
over the invasion by the U.S.  
1968 Attacks against Israel: In July 1968, a faction of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al civilian plane. In 
December 1968, two PFLP gunmen shot at an El Al plane, resulting in the death of an 
Israeli. In retaliation, an Israeli commando flew into Beirut’s international airport and 
destroyed more than a dozen civilian airliners belonging to various Arab carriers. 
Israel stated that their actions were justified because the Lebanese government was 
responsible for encouraging the PFLP. This resulted in dividing Lebanese society on 
how much Lebanon should interfere with Palestinian militant groups. The Sunni and 
Shia groups were pro-Palestinian factions and Maronite Christians were anti-






1969 Cairo Agreement: Maronite Christians had issues with the Cairo 
Agreement. They believed that the agreement gave too much power to Palestinians 
groups and formed pro-Maronite paramilitary groups (such as Phalange) in retaliation 
of the agreement. PLO used its new control to establish a "mini-state" in southern 
Lebanon and increased the number of attacks on settlements in northern Israel, which 
furthered the hostility between PLO and Maronite Christian groups.  
Bus Massacre on April 13, 1975 (Harris, 2012): The Bus Massacre was a 
series of fights between the Phalangists (a faction of the Christian Maronites) and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO). First, a group of PLO fighters 
carried out a drive-by shooting on a Greek Orthodox church in Ain al-Rammaneh, in 
which the majority of the church members were Phalangists. In retaliation, a group of 
Phalangists attacked a bus carrying Palestinian fighters and civilians on its way to a 















Appendix B: Summary Timeline of Key Moments in Lebanese History 
Before Civil War 
1516-1918: Ottoman Empire ruled over Lebanon 
1920-1943: France ruled over Lebanon  
1943: Lebanon gained independence 
1948: Arab-Israeli War  
1958: Lebanese Crisis  
1967: Israeli Six Day War 
1969: Cairo Agreement  
April 13, 1975: Bus Massacre (Official beginning of civil war)  
During Civil War 
December 6, 1975: Black Saturday 
October 1976: Syria began occupation of Lebanon 
February 7, 1978-April 1978: Hundred Days War 
1978: Coastal Road Massacre  
March 14, 1978: Operation Litani 
March 19, 1978: Establishment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL).  
Israel began providing financial resources and weaponry to the South 
Lebanese Army. 
June 6, 1982: Israel invaded Lebanon 
June 15, 1982: Israeli units entrenched outside Beirut and the U.S. began 





August 21, 1982: First troops of a multinational force landed in Beirut  
May 17, 1983: May 17 peace agreement (Israel would withdraw its troops 
conditional on the departure of Syrian troops)  
October 23, 1983: Suicide bombing on French and American military 
barracks 
March 5, 1984: May 17 peace agreement cancelled. U.S. Marines withdrawn 
from Lebanon. 
1985-1989: Attempts at national reconciliation failed and sectarian conflict 
worsened. 
September 1989: Taif Agreement 
October 13, 1990: 1990 Massacre (Official end of civil war)  
After Civil War 
May 22, 1991: Treaty to extend Syria’s occupation of Lebanon 
May 1991: Dissolution of all militias, except for Hezbollah 
1992: First free elections since 1972 
April 1996: Operation Grapes of Wrath 
May 23, 2000: Israel ended its occupation of Lebanon 
September 2, 2004: UN Security Council Resolution  
February 21, 2005-April 25, 2005: Daily protests of Syria’s occupation 
April 26, 2005: Syria ended its occupation of Lebanon 
After State Failure 
November 2007-May 21, 2008: March 9 bloc group (including Hezbollah) 





April 2008-May 21, 2008: Hezbollah’s Coup Attempt 
May 21, 2008: Doha Agreement  
January 2011: Collapse of Lebanese government 
June 2011: Lebanese Government is reconvened 
May 25, 2014: President Suleiman resigned from office 
May 25, 2014-October 2016: Hezbollah delayed the election of a new 
president until Hezbollah’s choice (Michel Aoun) was elected 
November 3, 2017: Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned 
November 22, 2017: Prime Minister Saad Hariri rescinds resignation 
May 6, 2018: First legislative election since 2009 was held. Hezbollah and 
allies win the majority of seats in Lebanon’s parliament. 
















Appendix C. Figures Displaying the Number of Terrorist Attacks by Targeting 
Types Across Each Time Period for Coding Principles 2 and 3 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Targeting Types for Each Time Period (Coding Principle 2 
– Spatial Context) 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Total Terrorist Attacks During Each Time Period 





































































































Figure 3: Changes in Targeting Types for Each Time Period (Coding Principle 3 
– Random) 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Total Terrorist Attacks During Each Time Period 







































































































Appendix D. Tables Displaying the Multinominal Logistic Coefficients, Marginal 
Effects, and Standard Errors for Coding Principles 2 and 3  
 
Table 1: Multinominal Logistic Coefficients and (SE) Predicting Target Types – 
Coding Principle 2 (Spatial Context) 









Time Periods    


















    
Control Variables    











































Note: * p-value≤ 0.05; **p-value≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests). 
 
Table 2: Marginal Effects and (SE) of Predicted Target Types – Coding 
Principle 2 (Spatial Context) 
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Note: * p-value≤ 0.05; **p-value≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests). 
 
Table 3: Multinominal Logistic Coefficients and (SE) Predicting Target Types – 
Coding Principle 3 (Random) 
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(0.850) (0.604) (0.614) 
 
Note: * p-value≤ 0.05; **p-value≤ 0.01 (one-tailed tests). 
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects and (SE) of Predicted Target Types – Coding 
Principle 3 (Random) 
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Appendix E. Tables and Figures Displaying the Changes in Targeting Types by 
Ideology Groups for Each Time Period 
 
Figure 1: Soft Targets by Ideology Group for Each Time Period (Coding 
Principle 2 – Spatial Context) 
 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Soft Target Type by Time 
Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 2 – Spatial Context) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.183 0.032 0.785 
Hezbollah 0.500 0.288 0.212 
Political 0.944 0.000 0.056 
Nationalist 0.877 0.018 0.105 
 
Figure 2: Terrorist Organization Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time 

























































































Table 2: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Terrorist Organization Target 
Type by Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 2 – 
Spatial Context) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.167 0.000 0.833 
Hezbollah 0.078 0.906 0.016 
Political 0.556 0.333 0.111 
Nationalist 0.588 0.353 0.059 
 
Figure 3: Foreign Entity Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 
(Coding Principle 2 – Spatial Context) 
 
 
Table 3: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Foreign Entity Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 2 – Spatial 
Context) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.647 0.059 0.294 
Hezbollah 0.400 0.580 0.020 
Political 0.833 0.083 0.083 
























































Figure 4: Government Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 
(Coding Principle 2 – Spatial Context) 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Government Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 2 – Spatial 
Context) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.400 0.000 0.600 
Hezbollah 0.267 0.533 0.200 
Political 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Nationalist 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Figure 5: Soft Targets by Ideology Group for Each Time Period (Coding 
























































































Table 5: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Soft Target Type by Time 
Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 3 - Random) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.176 0.033 0.791 
Hezbollah 0.520 0.320 0.160 
Political 0.944 0.000 0.056 
Nationalist 0.877 0.018 0.105 
 
Figure 6: Terrorist Organization Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time 
Period (Coding Principle 3 – Random) 
 
 
Table 6: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Terrorist Organization Target 
Type by Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 3 - 
Random) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.176 0.000 0.824 
Hezbollah 0.078 0.906 0.016 
Political 0.556 0.333 0.111 




















































Figure 7: Foreign Entity Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 
(Coding Principle 3 – Random) 
 
 
Table 7: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Foreign Entity Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 3 - Random) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.689 0.063 0.250 
Hezbollah 0.392 0.529 0.078 
Political 0.833 0.083 0.083 
Nationalist 0.927 0.073 0.000 
 
 
Figure 8: Government Target Type by Ideology Group for Each Time Period 























































































Table 8: Proportion of Terrorist Attacks with a Government Target Type by 
Time Period, Conditioned on Ideology Group (Coding Principle 3 - Random) 
 During Civil War After Civil War After State Failure 
Religious 0.444 0.000 0.556 
Hezbollah 0.250 0.563 0.188 
Political 1.000 0.000 0.000 
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